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Religious Freedom, Separation of Powers, and the
Reversal of Roles
Michael W. McConnell ∗
Observers from outside the United States must be struck by the
difference between the broadly tolerant and inclusive character of
public attitudes toward religious exercise in this nation, and the narrow compass of constitutional protection provided by its courts. After the Supreme Court’s well-known 1990 decision, Employment Division v. Smith,1 the courts ceased to provide any protection under
the Free Exercise Clause from any application of a neutral and generally applicable law. Even before Smith, when the Court purported to
hold that the government could not interfere with religious exercise
without a compelling governmental interest,2 free exercise claimants
very rarely prevailed in court. Almost always, the courts ruled either
that there had been no burden on religious exercise3 or that the government’s justification (even if seemingly weak) was compelling.4

∗ Presidential Professor, University of Utah College of Law. B.A. with honors, Michigan State University; J.D. with honors, University of Chicago Law School.
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (allowing
governmental restriction of tax-exempt status based on fundamental and overriding government interests “in eradicating racial discrimination in education”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (stating that only government interests of highest order could overcome
legitimate free exercise of religion claims); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (allowing government limitation of exercise of religion only to protect paramount interests).
3. See generally Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605–06 (1961) (finding Sunday
closing law did not make any of appellant’s religious practices unlawful); Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protection Ass’n, 475 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1998) (holding that construction
of logging road through sacred lands did not coerce beliefs and, therefore, did not violate the
free exercise clause); Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Donovan, 417 U.S. 290, 303–05
(1985) (holding that requiring religious volunteers to accept a minimum wage did not violate
their beliefs).
4. See generally Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 (determining “eradicati[on] [of] racial discrimination in education” constituted sufficient government interest to allow denial of
tax benefits); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–59 (1982) (finding burdens on religion
caused by mandatory participation in social security system justified); Goldman v. Weinberger,
472 U.S. 1016 (1986) (finding government interest in military morale overriding Jewish military officers’ claim to wear yarmulke with the uniform).
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Yet, even a cursory look at the statute books, or a more detailed
look at actual practices in the cities and states of the United States,
will reveal that the free exercise of religion is an honored value in
American life and that members of minority religious groups often
are given accommodations and exemptions that enable them to practice their faith even when it comes into conflict with generally applicable laws. Even before Smith, the greatest protection for free exercise of religion was not the prospect of successful litigation—since
free exercise litigation was rarely successful—but the ability of religious individuals and groups to persuade government officials to
provide reasonable accommodations to their religious needs. The
great value of the pre-Smith constitutional doctrine was that it
helped persons aggrieved by neutral and generally applicable laws to
obtain a second look from an official who might be less impressed by
the bureaucratic imperative of enforcing the rules as written, all the
time, without exception.
This pattern—generous protection for civil liberties by political
functionaries and scant protection by the courts—seems to defy our
usual expectations about judicial review and about the comparative
competence of governmental institutions. Basic political science
courses often describe judicial review as fundamental to the protection of individual interests from majority rule. The ability to challenge governmental action in court gives non-majoritarian interests
an avenue to overcome the majoritarian pronouncements of the legislatures. The democratic institutions of government represent
majority rule, while the courts in our system—or in any system with
judicial review—are more amenable to protecting minority interests.
If this traditional political science model is applied in practice to
the free exercise of religion, we would expect to find laws passed by
majoritarian legislatures that violate the free exercise of religion, followed by court decisions protecting religious minorities. (I speak of
religious minorities because, even though the First Amendment protects all religions equally, legislation rarely has a negative impact
upon the practitioners of large, powerful religions. They are usually
able to organize and protect themselves in the political process without ever having to go to court. Or so one would expect from the
traditional political science model.) And yet, when we look at the actual record of democratic institutions versus the courts in the United
States, it turns out that reality does not conform to the political science model we have been taught. It is very nearly the opposite. Leg612
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islatures have shown a remarkable degree of solicitude for minority
religious interests, and courts in the United States have repeatedly—
not always, but frequently—struck down the efforts of legislatures to
protect minority religious groups as unconstitutional.
The most conspicuous example of this exchange of traditional
political roles may be seen in the recent interplay between the Congress of the United States and the United States Supreme Court in
the wake of the Smith5 decision. The Court in Smith held that the
Free Exercise Clause provides no protection against laws that are
neutral and of general applicability.6 The print was barely dry on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Smith when Congress began considering legislation to reverse that decision. Although it could not overturn the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretation, Congress
sought, through enactment of a federal civil rights statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”),7 to provide a statutory
remedy for any person whose exercise of religion is substantially burdened by a governmental act. Through RFRA, Congress sought to
provide the same statutory protection that the Supreme Court had
previously provided as a matter of constitutional interpretation.
Let us consider the traditional political science model in light of
these developments—the decision in Smith and the enactment of
RFRA. In Smith, the Supreme Court stated that it was not the judiciary’s task to protect minority religious interests, and the Court
worried openly about “courting anarchy.”8 Accordingly, the Court’s
decision upheld majoritarian values and preserved the ability of the
government to ensure that governmental policy is enforced without
the irritant of minority religious interests. In contrast, the Congress
of the United States did not equate protection of minority religious
interests with the possibility of courting anarchy. By enacting RFRA,
Congress commanded that majoritarian interests should take second
seat to minority religious interests, where this can be accomplished
without undue harm to legitimate governmental interests. Remarkably—in light of the traditional political science model—the legislation passed Congress by a unanimous vote in the House of Representatives and a nearly unanimous vote in the Senate.9 It was the
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 879.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
The Senate passed RFRA by a vote of 97 to 3, and the House of Representatives
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legislature, not the judiciary, that was more responsive to minority
interests; and it was the Court, not the legislature, that was most solicitous of majoritarian values.
The juxtaposition of roles becomes even more peculiar when you
consider that the United States Supreme Court subsequently held
RFRA unconstitutional, at least as applied to the actions of state and
local governments.10 In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court struck
down RFRA, calling the Act “so out of proportion to a supposed
remedial or preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”11 In
critique of the City of Boerne decision, I have previously argued that
the Court should have pursued a more modest judicial role, giving
greater respect to the democratic choices represented by congressional enactment of RFRA.12 However, regardless of the correctness
of the City of Boerne decision, the entire saga casts doubt on the traditional political science model, in which judicial review provides a
backstop for minority interests against a legislative branch that is presumed to be concerned with the majority.
Looking more broadly at this question, we find that the actions
of Congress and the Supreme Court surrounding the Smith case
were not aberrational. Many pieces of recent legislation were enacted
precisely in order to provide protection for individual rights that the
courts failed to provide. Contrary to the majoritarian principles traditionally evident in legislation, such statutes demonstrate the desire of
the legislature to correct perceived failures of the federal courts to
enforce and protect religious liberty. A number of recent examples
serve to illustrate this phenomenon.
In 1984, Congress passed the Equal Access Act13 to protect the
rights of religious students to meet for bible study and prayer as noncurricular clubs in the public schools. This statute countered decisions of the federal courts of appeals that had uniformly held that
passed the Act unanimously. Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at A18.
10. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court’s opinion did not
hold RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the actions of the federal government, and thus the
Act likely still applies to federal governmental action. See In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 858–59
(8th Cir. 1998).
11. Flores, 521 U.S. at 532.
12. Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 156 (1997).
13. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–4074 (1988).
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secondary schools were not a public forum where religious views
could be freely expressed.14 In 1994, Congress passed the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments,15 countering the precise decision in the Smith case and protecting religious use of peyote
by Native Americans. In establishing such protection, Congress declared that “the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the
religious use of peyote by Indians may serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and cultures, and increase the risk that they will
be exposed to discriminatory treatment.”16 In 1998, the Religious
Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act17 was signed into
law to protect religious institutions, churches, and religious donors
from bankruptcy courts that sought to seize contributions that had
been made in the ordinary course of giving prior to the donor’s filing
for bankruptcy.
Most recently, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,18 restricting certain governmental burdens on religious exercise by states and local governments.
First, in response to zoning boards resisting religious land use, the
Act prohibits enforcement of land use regulations “that impose[] a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a
religious assembly or institution.”19 This section of the Act protects
religious construction activities, such as the building of houses of
worship, and restricts government control of religious property use,
such as restrictions on whether churches are able to operate homeless
shelters and feeding programs on their premises. Second, the Act
prohibits imposition of governmental restrictions that substantially
burden the religious rights of persons “residing in or confined to an
institution.”20
Further, within the United States political framework, Congress
is not the sole legislative body to enact statutes addressing the free
exercise of religious rights of individuals. A number of states have

14. See Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038,
1048 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1980).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (1994).
16. Id. § (a)(5).
17. Pub. L. No. 105-183, 112 Stat. 517 (1998) (principally codified at 11 U.S.C. §§
544, 548, and 1325 (Supp. IV 1998)).
18. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (Sept. 22, 2000).
19. Id. § 2(a)(1).
20. Id. § 3(a).
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passed their own versions of RFRA, protecting the free exercise of
religion at the state level.21 These state laws provide protection not
only when religion is singled out for purposeful discrimination, but
also when a neutral and generally applicable law creates incidental
burdens on the practice of religion. In fact, a recent survey of federal
and state law revealed more than 2000 different state and federal
statutes that protect religions, and especially religious minorities,
against various forms of legislation.22
Indeed, the variety of forms of protection offered through legislation is mind boggling. Consider these examples: A statute addressing meat inspection includes specific protections for kosher slaughterhouses; the Social Security law includes protections for ministers
in churches that do not believe in the compulsory contributions by
clergy to social security; state licensing statutes include protections
for religious daycare centers; employment discrimination laws provide protections for the hiring practices of churches and synagogues;
Medicare and Medicaid protect members of religions that do not believe in medicine so that they may still take some advantage of those
programs. These are just a few of literally hundreds of examples.
The attention paid by the legislatures of the United States,
whether state or federal, to the free exercise of religion is quite remarkable. In fact, a comparison of free exercise constitutional cases
heard in all of the courts with the record of legislatures in passing religious accommodation laws demonstrates that legislatures, rather
than courts, have been most attentive to the problems created for religious minorities by generally applicable laws. Court cases addressing the free exercise of religion are more likely to consider whether
legislative accommodations of individual religious liberty violate the
Establishment Clause than whether individual religious rights have
been violated. Consider the different pieces of federal legislation
cited previously. Tellingly, all but one of these statutes have been the
subject of serious judicial challenge, based on the claim that they violate the Establishment Clause. For example, the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act was signed into law only recently.

21. See Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 605, 607 n.4 (1999).
22. See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445 (1992).
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However, defendants have already challenged the constitutionality of
the Act in four different cases.
It has been said that in theory, theory and practice are the same;
but in practice, they are different. In political science theory, the judicial system is more likely than the legislature to be receptive to the
needs of religious minorities or, for that matter, other civil rights minorities. The practice is quite different. In practice, in a properly constituted democratic system, the legislatures frequently have provided
greater protection for the rights of religious liberty than has been
provided through constitutional decisions from the courts.
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